Bypassing Smart-Card Authentication
Jonathan Lee and Neil Pahl explores bypassing smart-card authentication at DEF CON 18, examining physical-security and practical defenses.
Summary
Architecture and Background
Jonathan Lee & Neil Pahl - Bypassing Smart-Card Authentication and Blocking Debiting: Vulnerabilities in Atmel Cryptomemory-Based Stored-Value Systems Atmel CryptoMemory based smart cards are deemed to be some of the most secure on the market, boasting a proprietary 64-bit mutual authentication protocol, attempts counter, encrypted checksums, anti-tearing counter measures, and more.
Vulnerability Analysis
Yet none of these features are useful when the system implementation is flawed.
Exploitation and Demonstrations
Communications were sniffed, protocols were analyzed, configuration memory was dumped, and an elegant hardware man-in-the-middle attack was developed.
Remediation and Defensive Strategies
From start to finish, we will show you how concepts learned from an introductory computer security class were used to bypass the security measures on a Cryptomemory based stored value smart card laundry system, with suggestions on how things can improve. Jonathan Lee is a Computer Engineering student from the University of British Columbia. Neil Pahl is a recent graduate of the University of British Columbia in Electrical Engineering. For copies of the slides and additional materials please see the DEF CON 18 Archive here:
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