Hacking .NET Server
Dr. Cyrus Peikari and Seth Fogie explores hacking .net server at DEF CON 10, examining dotnet-security and practical defenses.
Summary
Architecture and Background
Cyrus Peikari & Seth Fogie - Hacking .NET Server Windows .NET Server is Microsoft's new contender against Linux in the server market. Scheduled for release in 2003, .NET Server (which was originally released for beta testing under the codename "Whistler") is re-engineered from the Windows 2000 Server codebase. .NET Server's survival will probably depend on how users perceive its security.
Vulnerability Analysis
Bill Gates himself realized this when he released his "Trustworthy Computing" memo in Jan. His ultimatum echoed what hackers have been saying for years: get secure or fail. This speech will focus on the new security features in .NET Server -- and how to break them.
Exploitation and Demonstrations
The purpose is to identify early weaknesses while the OS is still a release candidate so that developers and network administrators can make informed decisions before deployment. This talk is technical, using live examples and some source code, but there will also be enough general information to benefit anyone interested in .NET Server security. Coverage includes weaknesses and exploits in the following areas: # Windows Product Activation (WPA) on .NET Server # New Encrypting File System (EFS) changes # .NET Server Smart Card support # Kerberos implementation # Wireless standard implementation # Remote Desktop Security # Death of the Microsoft Security Partners Program (MSSP) # Microsoft security partners full disclosure "gag rule" Dr.
Remediation and Defensive Strategies
Cyrus Peikari is Chief Technology Officer of VirusMD Corporation. Seth Fogie is Director of Engineering at of VirusMD Corporation. Peikari and Fogie co-authored the first book ever written on .NET Server: "Windows .NET Server Security Handbook" from Prentice Hall PTR (ISBN 0130477265).
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