Hardware Trojans Infiltrating the Faraday Cage

Architecture and Background

Hardware Trojans: Infiltrating the Faraday Cage Stephen 'afterburn' Janansky CVORG, University of Delaware Nick Waite CVORG, University of Delaware Last year we presented some hardware trojans as a proof of concept for side-channel data exfiltration attack. Pretty blinking lights are sweet, but this time we wanted to give the hungry crowd something more crunchy to bite into. Namely, that age-old problem of how to get data in and out of a device on a secured network, no network all, or even in a SCIF, perhaps... With some hardware voodoo, let's see what manner of electronic telekinesis we can accomplish!

Vulnerability Analysis

p.s. Our friends who wish to remain nameless say that this is considered trivial "on the other side of the wall". Is it really? Let's see if any show up!

Exploitation and Demonstrations

That's right, we're laying the bait, let's play spot the fed. Stephen 'afterburn' Janansky is a Senior CPEG at UD. He can usually be found in the lab flirting on the edge between hardware and software, killing routers and other electronics by the dozens (and then asking Nick to resurrect them), and taking blinky lights to a new level. He is a member of CVORG, dreams of hardware security, and is one of the most ADD engineers you will ever meet.

Remediation and Defensive Strategies

Nick Waite has been flitting about the edges of academia for years while managing to avoid graduation. During his tenure he has done analog IC design, microcontroller system design, and pcb design projects in support of military, solar, agricultural, and other Important Projects. His interests and hobbies include DIY and low-tech engineering, organic chemistry, genetic algorithms, linguistics, finance, biofeedback, outdoor survival, peace, love, and freedom. He hopes to someday find harmony between machines and nature. Make sure to ask him about Korea! For copies of the slides and additional materials please see the DEF CON 17 Archive here: