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Remote Online Balloting Delivery

Susan Greenhalgh

Compares client-side and server-side architectures for remote ballot marking and analyzes their security and privacy risks.

Summary

Remote Electronic Ballot Delivery During Pandemics

Election administrators increasingly deploy digital delivery systems to provide blank ballots to absentee voters and ensure accessible ballot marking for voters with disabilities.

Server-Side Versus Client-Side Marking Architectures

Remote ballot marking platforms diverge into systems that process selections on a remote cloud server and those that operate statelessly on the voter's local client device.

Security and Privacy Risk Profiles

Server-side marking introduces critical attack surfaces, including voter surveillance, ballot manipulation, and man-in-the-middle tampering by hosting providers or malicious actors.

Architectural Recommendations for Accessible Balloting

Mitigating privacy and integrity risks requires adopting stateless client-side rendering and printing physical paper ballots for postal return or secure drop box submission.

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