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Repercussions from the Absence of Threat Actor Taxonomy by Jeffrey Bell

Jeffrey Bell

Repercussions from the Absence of Threat Actor Taxonomy by Jeffrey Bell.

Summary

The Naming Problem

Jeffrey Bell argues inconsistent threat-actor naming undermines IOC accumulation and ATT&CK mapping. Without uniform taxonomy, the same actor appears under many aliases—he cites Kim Suuki referenced sixteen different ways across industry reports—fragmenting intelligence sharing.

Threat Actor Categories

Bell groups actors into criminal (financial motives, e.g., Scattered Spider casino breaches), state-sponsored (geopolitical targets including elections, ICS, and research), and hacktivist (ideological, e.g., SiegedSec actions against Heritage Foundation). Overlaps exist, but buckets clarify motive and targeting context.

MITRE ATT&CK as a Shared Language

Using a fictional SOC scenario, he shows vendors like CrowdStrike and Unit 42 independently observing overlapping infrastructure yet struggling to merge attribution. Bell proposes MITRE ATT&CK’s open knowledge base as a neutral framework to align TTPs across naming schemes, improving collective defense without marketing-driven alias proliferation.

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