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What’s Really in the Box? The Case for Hardware Provenance and HBOMs

Allan Friedman

Makes the case for Hardware Bills of Materials (HBOMs) to trace semiconductor provenance, detect component cloning, and secure hardware supply chains.

Summary

The Blind Spot in Hardware Supply Chains

While Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) have gained significant traction for software transparency, hardware component provenance remains an opaque black box. Counterfeit chips, unauthorized silicon revisions, and obscure fabrication origins create systemic security risks across critical infrastructure.

Limitations of Traditional Procurement BOMs

Traditional bills of materials track basic procurement part numbers and assembly logistics, but fail to record manufacturing origin, silicon provenance, or cryptographic component integrity. They cannot detect unauthorized hardware modifications or counterfeit chips.

The Hardware Bill of Materials (HBOM) Initiative

The HBOM initiative establishes standardized formats and tooling to track hardware component origins, silicon design provenance, and supply chain lineage from fabrication through final device assembly.

Empowering Risk-Informed Procurement

Adopting HBOMs enables government agencies and critical infrastructure operators to audit hardware supply chains, verify component integrity, and make informed risk decisions without relying solely on geographic trade restrictions.

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