Evaluating Wireless Attacks on Real-World Avionics: GPS & Mode S Spoofing
Leeloo Granger evaluates wireless attacks on certified Garmin GTN750 avionics hardware, demonstrating live GPS and Mode S spoofing in a certified testbed.
Summary
Validating Theoretical Aviation Vulnerabilities on Real Hardware
While academic literature frequently models wireless attacks on aircraft navigation, testing certified, commercially deployed avionics hardware in lab environments is rare.
Building the Avionics Experimental Testbed
Leeloo Granger presents testing conducted on certified Garmin GTN750 navigators using Software-Defined Radios (USRP B210 and BladeRF).
Executing Live GPS and Mode S Transponder Spoofing
Granger demonstrates generating crafted RF signals to alter cockpit GPS location fixes, trigger false collision alerts (TCAS), and suppress emergency transponder telemetry.
Recommendations for Resilient Airborne Navigation
The author discusses practical mitigations, including multi-constellation GNSS receivers, spatial antenna filtering, and sensor fusion algorithms.
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